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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN GYPSUM TRUST, a
common law trust, and JOHN
PAUL JONES, ROBERT JONES,
JOHN RUSSELL RITTER, DONALD W.
McEWEN and BARRY PHILLIPS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

I Civil No.
)

13919

vs.
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Through their Appeal Brief, plaintiffs studiously avoid either
confronting or replying to the critical issues raised in the brief of
defendant. Instead, they seek to divert the attention of this Court
from those issues through broad brush and erroneous characterizations of defendant's motives, of the state of this Record on Appeal
and of legal conclusions to be drawn therefrom.
I.
DEFENDANT'S MOTIVE BELOW AND ITS PURPOSE IN PROCESSING THIS APPEAL WAS TO
ENFORCE THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS
1
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PROVISIONS OF THE "FIFTY-YEAR LEASE"
BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS CONSTRUED BY
THE "DECLARATORY JUDGMENT" ENTERED
BY THE COURT BELOW IN THE PRIOR CASE.
Plaintiffs' assertion at pages 2 and 3 of their brief that defendant has mis-stated to this Court the nature of this litigation with a
purpose to obtain "a complete re-trial" and "reversal" of the
"Declaratory Judgment previously entered by the trial court"
could not be further from the fact and the truth. The controlling
lease language is quoted verbatim at pages 4 and 5 of defendant's
brief. Royalty payments thereunder are conditioned upon the availability on the leasehold premises of "rock of the kind and
quality needed." [Emphasis added] The lease language specifically mandates that the 7% net profit royalty must be ' 'determined
in accordance with sound accounting principles and practices in
the gypsum industry." [Emphasis added] In interpreting and
clarifying the rights and obligations of the parties in computing the
7% royalty, the court below in the Amended Declaratory Judgment (R. 414-15), mandated by the opinion of this Court, ruled
that the same in the future must be calculated by the accounting
' 'method approved by the lessor and utilized by the parties in the
years prior to 1965" [Emphasis added]
As defendant points out in its opening brief, plaintiffs, not
defendant, seek to circumvent the clear and plain meaning of that
language. This Lease language has been in the Lease since its
inception, was not changed or modified in any way by the prior
Judgment of Judge Erickson, by the prior opinion of this Court or
by the Amended Declaratory Judgment. Plaintiffs consented to,
and indeed sponsored, the critical language quoted above from the
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Amended Declaratory Judgment designed to govern prospective
performance under the Lease. This clear and precise language
from the Lease and the Amended Declaratory Judgment are binding upon the parties, were binding upon the Court below and, it is
respectfully urged, are binding upon this Court. We here seek to
have the 7% royalty calculated in strict conformance with this
controlling language for calendar years 1971, 1972, and 1973.
Plaintiffs criticize defendant for characterizing plaintiffs' suit
as an action for "damages for breach of Lease." They assert that
the same in fact is an action to enforce the "Declaratory Judgment." However, regardless of the form of the characterization,
the issue between the parties is the proper interpretation of the
Lease language as construed in the Amended Declaratory Judgment. The plaintiffs submitted evidence at the trial which was
received and incorporated into Findings, Conclusions and Judgment that the sum of $330,859.66 was due for calendar years
1971, 1972 and 1973. Defendant submitted, by way of offer of
proof, both testimony and documentary evidence showing that the
amounts due under the language of the Lease, so construed, range
from the sum of $161,597.00 to $247,157.00, depending upon the
production level selected by the trier of fact for the period in
question.
A determination of whether the plaintiffs' number or the
defendant's number is correct turns upon four basic issues offact:
1. What was the accounting "method approved by the lessor
and utilized by the parties in the years prior to 1965?"
As defendant discusses at length in its opening brief, plaintiffs
offered no evidence on this subject. Defendant properly proffered
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admissible evidence on this subject which was erroneously rejected by the Court below. (Tr. 109).
2. Are actual books and records available from which the 7%
net royalty can be computed?
Plaintiffs' accounting witness testified that there were not.
However, defendant proffered competent and admissible accounting testimony by an expert that such records were available, were
examined personally by him, and were the basis of the royalty
figures which he computed and which are contained in Exhibits A,
B and C, each of which was received in evidence as a proper
proffer of proof, but erroneously rejected as evidence by the Court
below upon the grounds of relevancy. (Tr. 108, 113).
3. What is the amount of the 7% net royalty owingfor calendar
years 1971-73, utilizing the "method approved by the lessor and
utilized by the parties in years prior to 1965" consistent with
"sound accounting principles and practices in the gypsum industry"?
Plaintiffs' expert stated an opinion as to the appropriate sum
which was erroneously received by the Court over proper objection of defendant and incorporated into Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment. Defendant's expert witness, through testimony and
documentary evidence, tendered and received by the Court below
as a proffer of proof, but erroneously rejected as evidence, showed
different amounts due. (Tr. 114-15)
4. Was there sufficient ore in the leased premises of the kind
and quality required to manufacture all of the gypsum products
sold by defendant in 1971, 1972 and 1973 in the defined market
area?
4
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Plaintiffs elected to ignore completely this requirement of the
express Lease language and of the Amended Declaratory Judgment and offered no evidence on this subject. Defendant offered to
show by competent testimony the absence of a requisite amount of
ore. Defendant's evidence was accepted as a proper proffer of
proof but erroneously rejected as evidence by the Court below.
Our position on this appeal is that plaintiffs' evidence on these
subjects, to the extent offered at all, was not admissible. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo admissibility of plaintiffs' evidence, the Trial Court erred in rejecting the evidence proffered by
defendant on each of these controlling and contested issues of fact.
II.
DEFENDANT'S PROFFER OF PROOF WAS
PROPER, THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
PROFFERED WAS RELEVANT AND ADMISSI- BLE AND THE COURT BELOW GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN ITS EXCLUSION.
Plaintiffs suggest through inference and footnote at page 3 of
their brief that defendant's proffer of proof was somehow improper or insufficient in form. This suggestion has no merit whatsoever.
Certain language of the Court below, in framing the narrow
legal framework within which the trial was to proceed, is quoted in
defendant's opening brief. In addition, the following colloquy
between the Court and counsel for defendant further clarifies and
narrows the ruling of law under which the trial then proceeded (Tr.
32):
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THE COURT: * * * I'm concerned the only thing before this court right now is, first, whether or not the
books are available between 70 and 73 (1) I want an
accounting procedure and I want it based on Exhibits
139 to 143, whatever they may say and that's really all I
want.
MR. TAYLOR: And you will not accept any evidence
as to any .other accounting procedure?
THE COURT: No sir, I won't. * * *
Consequently, defendant's record necessarily was made by
offer of proof. That offer was made in strict conformance to Rule
43(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Both the testimonial
offer and the offer of Exhibits A, B and C were received in
evidence by the Court below as proper proffers of proof, but
rejected as being irrelevant to the narrow legal issue as erroneously
framed by the Court. Plaintiffs did not object to the form of the
offer of proof, but only to its substance as being' 'outside the issues
of the case as delineated by the Court's preliminary ruling." (Tr.
181). The Court then ruled as to the proffered testimony of the
numerous witnesses to be called by defendant (Tr. 122):
The objection is sustained as to that but the proffer of
proof is accepted over the Court's sustaining that objection.
Similarly, defendant's accounting exhibits, demonstrating its
version of the amounts due under the controlling lease agreement,
were proffered in evidence by defendant. Plaintiffs objected upon
the same ground and the Court ruled (Tr. 123):
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Well, your objection is sustained but it is accepted as to
proffer of proof and that goes to Exhibits A, B and C.
In further clarification, after a "foundation" objection was first
posed and then withdrawn by plaintiffs to Exhibit C, the Court
below ruled (Tr. 125):
Alright, then Exhibit " C " is admitted for the purposes
stated as a proffer of proof.
MR. TAYLOR: But rejected as an Exhibit.
THE COURT: That's right.
(Whereupon defendant's Exhibits A, B and C
were duly admitted in evidence.)
The discussion in plaintiffs' brief setting forth what they claim
to be "uncontroverted material facts", together with re-recitation
of the same erroneous "facts" throughout the argument, does not
square with the Record on Appeal. Illustrative of the numerous and
repeated mis-statements is the summary at page 13 of plaintiffs'
Brief stating:
More importantly, defendant has offered no evidence
and does not even claim that its records are not now
subject to the other serious deficiencies that made them
inadequate and insufficient in the prior case. / /
defendant's offer of proof had been that there were now
records available that were accumulated and presented
in the same manner and by the same methods as were
employed between the parties in the pre-1965 period,
we would have a different case. Defendant did not
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make any such assertion in its offer of proof because
any such assertion would be contrary to the fact.
[Emphasis added]
Defendant's whole proffer of proof demonstrated that we do
here have such a "different case". The proffer of proof first
demonstrated the precise nature of the pre-1965 accounting procedure. It then proceeded to show that every record necessary to
make the computations required by pre-1965 procedure were in
existence for the period 1971-73, had in fact been examined by
defendant's expert witness and were the basis of the computations
contained in the proffered but rejected Exhibits A, B and C.
Illustrative, defendant offered to prove that Mr. Fred Oliver, after
having been duly qualified as an expert accounting witness,
"would testify that sound accounting principles as applied to
Sigurd and applied to those years 1971, 2 and 3 required the use of
the actual and factual data in the year in which the computation
was made if available and that they are available and that a defect
in Exhibits 139 through 143 trying to apply them to 1971, 2 and 3 is
that they are purely projections and unrelated to the data that is
available and useable which Mr. Oliver will testify that he used in
making his computations." [Tr. 113; emphasis added]
In addition to constituting admissible evidence, this tender of
proof removes any conceivable justification for admission in evidence of plaintiffs' Exhibits 139-143 in this case. As argued at
some length in defendant's opening brief, those exhibits, premised
as they are upon arbitrary assumptions and projections, were
admitted in the prior case only because of absence in that record of
actual data. The availability of actual records for each of the years
here in question makes inadmissible plaintiffs' guesses and projections of what those records may show.
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Rather than list each of the numerous and repeated erroneous
statements in plaintiffs' brief concerning defendant's offer of
proof, we simply invite the attention of the Court thereto and urge
that the Court make its own determination of the content thereof.
The proffer described in some detail each of the accounting exhibits and carefully demonstrated that there were now records
available that were accumulated and presented in the same manner
and by the same methods as were employed between the parties in
the pre-1965 period, the method required by the Amended Declaratory Judgment, precisely contrary to plaintiffs' representations in that regard. (Plaintiffs' Brief at p. 13)
HI.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs misconstrue defendant's constitutional argument.
This argument is not premised upon a failure or refusal of the Court
below to permit defendant to make a proper proffer of proof. The
Court below was very careful to permit defendant so to do. The
form of the proffer was stipulated by the parties, was not objected
to by either the Court or the parties, was accepted as a proper
proffer by the Court and was not the subject of appeal by plaintiffs.
The error here claimed by defendant is the Court's initial ruling not
to receive in evidence any factual information with respect to any
accounting procedure other than those necessarily hypothetical
assumptions and projections which underpin Exhibits 13 9-143 in
the prior case. The affirmance by this Court of the refusal of the
Trial Court to receive and weigh the highly relevant evidence
proffered by defendant would indeed constitute a deprivation of
property without due process.
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CONCLUSION
It is difficult to reply to a broad brush conclusory argument
such as is contained in both the "Statement of Facts" and "Argument" in plaintiffs' Brief. To the extent the respective parties are
claiming contrary facts in the record of this case, we invite the
attention of the Court to the cited pages of the Record on Appeal.
We are confident an examination of the record itself will demonstrate the accuracy of the statements made by defendant in its
opening Brief and will make clear beyond cavil the serious error of
the Court below.
Respectfully submitted,
KEITH E. TAYLOR
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
P. O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Defendant-Appellant
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